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Abstract - New generation radio equipment, used by sol-
diers and vehicles on the battlefield, form ad hoc networks
and specifically, Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANET). The
battlefields where these equipment are deployed include a
majority of coalition communication. Each group on the
battleground may communicate with other members of the
coalition and establish inter-MANET links. These inter-
MANET links are governed by routing policies that can
be summarized as Allowed or Denied link. However, if
more than two groups form a coalition, blocked multi-
hop communications and non-desired transmissions due
to these restrictive policies would appear. In this paper,
we present these blocking cases and theoretically evaluate
their apparition frequency. Then, we present two alterna-
tives to extend the binary policies and decrease the number
of blocking cases. Finally, we describe an experimental
scenario containing a blocking case and evaluate our
propositions and their performance. Keywords—ad hoc, inter-
domain, routing, policy
I. INTRODUCTION
On the battleground, several nations or entities can collabo-
rate to fight against one or several enemies. These elements,
sharing the same goal, can be grouped under a coalition.
However, each entity of the coalition would keep control on
its transmitted data. This can be done by using routing policies
which define the level of data each group would share with the
others. On wired networks, BGP (Border Gateway Protocol)
[10] ensures these functions and allows network operators
to collaborate in order to build the Internet network. Traffic
engineering can be done to promote some domains and reject
some others. In military environments, the exchanged data
can be very sensitive leading that these routing policies can
simply be summarized as "permitted" or "denied" (i.e. binary
policies). Due to soldiers mobility, allies can be distant (not
in direct range communication) requiring multi-hop commu-
nication. If a denied member of the coalition is on the route
between two allies, this communication would be interrupted.
In the same way, once you transmit your routing data to a
trusted neighbor, routing protocol naturally send information
to other neighbors, that can be untrusted members, creating
non-desired transmission. Consequently, it is necessary to
provide solutions to avoid the above-mentioned cases, and
hence establish these communications. In this paper, we first
evaluate the amount of blocked communications and non-
desired transmitted information due to binary policies. Then,
we propose two methods to extend these routing policies.
Finally, we apply our propositions in a network example and
evaluate their performance.
II. CURRENT LIMITATIONS OF BINARY POLICIES
In this section, we evaluate the limitations of the policy
model of our previous work ITMAN [6]1. Two aspects will be
handled. The blocked communications between distant allies,
and the non-desired transmissions.
A. Multi-hop blocked communications
Due to the binary policies, distant allies would be unable
to communicate. In Figure 1, we illustrate this situation by
an example. Groups A and C, that are distant and allowed to
communicate, are blocked by the denied policy between B and
C on the route. Usually, we consider the following situation as
a blocking case. Two groups, that are allowed to communicate,
not directly connected and other groups are part of the data
route. However, if two adjacent groups of the data route have a
deny policy between them, they will block the communication
which should be established between the two allowed distant
groups.
A B C
Multi-hop Allow
One-hop Allow
Multi-hop Deny
One-hop Deny
Figure 1: Example of a blocking case
These blocking cases are evaluated by using two matrices:
the connectivity matrix (Mc) of the groups, and the policy
matrix (Mp) applied between the groups. Mc and Mp are two
square matrices of size n, where n is the number of groups in
the coalition. Each group is designed by a number from 1 to
n. We use the topology of Figure 2a as example. The matrix
representation of the connections in this coalition, illustrated
in Figure 2b, is done as follows:
• Mc[i][j] = Mc[j][i]: links are symmetric,
1Reading this article is recommended to understand the whole issues aimed
in this paper.
• Mc[i][j] = 1: groups i and j are directly connected (for
i 6= j),
• Mc[i][j] = 0: groups i and j are not directly connected
(for i 6= j),
• Mc[i][i] = 2: not valuable connection (for i = j).
The matrix representation of the policies applied in the coali-
tion, illustrated by Figure 2c is done as follows:
• Mp[i][j] = Mc[j][i]: policy is symmetric,
• Mp[i][j] = 1: groups i and j are allowed to exchange
data (for i 6= j),
• Mp[i][j] = 0: groups i and j are not allowed to exchange
data (for i 6= j),
• Mp[i][i] = 2: not valuable policy (for i = j).
1
2
3
4
(a) An example of Ad Hoc
topology and associate policies

2 1 0 0
1 2 1 1
0 1 2 0
0 1 0 2

(b) Matrix representation of the
topology (Mc)
2 1 1 1
1 2 0 0
1 0 2 0
1 0 0 2

(c) Matrix representation of the
inter-domain policy (Mp)
Figure 2: Topology and policy representations for a given
topology
In this evaluation, we will compute all possible topolo-
gies for various number of groups. If four groups form the
coalition, then 64 possible topologies will result. For a sake
of simplification, we consider that all links are symmetric,
if group 1 is connected to group 2, then, group 2 is also
connected to group 1. Furthermore, the number of nodes
in groups is not important in our case. Our objective is to
evaluate inter-group blocking cases, which is independent of
the number of nodes in groups. On each possible topology
for a fixed number of groups, we apply all the possible
combination of policies. Thus, to evaluate the amount of
cases for a four-group coalition, we compute all the 4.096
topology/policy combinations (64 policy combinations applied
on the 64 possible topologies).
For each couple of topology/policy, represented by Mc and
Mp, we calculate two routing tables on each group of the
network. The first is made with the Dijkstra algorithm, to
calculate the shortest path to other groups. The second one
is calculated with a variation of the Dijkstra algorithm to have
a routing table influenced by the policies. This variation is
about the link cost calculation. If two groups are adjacent but
their policy do not allow them to communicate, the cost link
is considered as infinite (i.e. the groups are not in range).
Once the two routing tables have been computed, we check
the following criteria to determine if the current network
and its topology/policy combination have blocked communi-
cations:
• Groups A and B are allowed to communicate,
• Groups A and B are not connected directly,
• Group A can reach group B via the basic routing table,
and reciprocally,
• Group A can not reach group B via the policy table, and
reciprocally.
The amount of blocking cases is evaluated from two point
of views:
(i) the network view,
(ii) the group view.
Considering the example of Figure 2a, communications
between groups 1 and 3 are blocked, as there is the group
2 on the route, which does not want to communicate with the
group 3. Even if other couples of groups are able to exchange
data, we consider the network as blocked. In networks with
more than three groups, this case would nearly appear at least
once for each combination of topology/policy. For this reason,
we decided to evaluate the blocking cases from the group view.
If a couple is blocked, we continue the computation for the
other couple of groups. For the example of Figure 2a, there
are six group couples to study (1-2 ; 1-3 ; 1-4 ; 2-3 ; 2-4 ; 3-4),
mainly due to the symmetric links and policies. Couples 1-4
and 1-3 satisfy the blocking conditions that have been listed
previously. Considering this network from the group point of
view, the blocking rate is about 33.33%.
Figure 3 presents the amount of blocking cases depending
on the number of groups in the coalition. As presented
previously, it is computed on the network and group views.
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Figure 3: Theoretical blocked communications rates
These results show that from the group point of view, there
is a small rate of blocked communications due to binary
policies. However, the probability to have at least one blocking
case in the whole network fastly increases in comparison to
the number of groups. This result means that in a coalition
network, if restricted policies are applied, some information
would not be transmitted in more than half of the cases.
Consequently, there is a need to extend these policies in order
to improve the communication rate.
B. Non-desired transmission
The other problem that can occur due to binaries policies is
the non-desired transmission of routing information. Once you
send your routing data to a trusted neighbor, nothing prevents
him from sending your data to a distant group. However, the
original sender do not want them to be received by an untrusted
group, from its policy view. The example of Figure 4 illustrates
this situation.
Group A Group B
Group C
Deny policy
Figure 4: Representation of non-desired transmission issue
On the same matrix representation, we compute all possible
topologies and policies. On each network, for each couple of
groups, we check the following criteria to evaluate the amount
of non-desired transmission:
• Groups A and B are not allowed to communicate,
• Group A can reach group B via the basic routing table,
and reciprocally,
• All reachable groups via Group A policy table are se-
lected,
• If at least one of them can reach Group B, there is a
non-desired transmission.
Figure 5 presents the amount of non-desired transmission
cases depending on the number of groups in the coalition. As
presented for the blocked communications, it is computed on
the network and group views.
In a network where several domains are interconnected, a
significant rate of routing information are leaked by other
groups. In large coalition, more than a half of the commu-
nications can be transmitted against the will of the source.
After the theoretical evaluation of blocked or non-desired
communications, we pointed out that a need to improve the
routing policy in inter-domain communications to improve
global performance. In the next section, we propose two
algorithms to soften the binary policies.
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Figure 5: Theoretical non-desired transmission rates
III. EXTENSIONS OF BINARY ROUTING POLICIES
In this section, we present two propositions to improve inter-
group communications. We make the assumption that in the
coalition context, even if there are communication restrictions
between some groups, they collaborate and transmit routing
data of other groups. With this availability assumption, we
focus on the confidentiality of the transmitted data through the
other groups. Furthermore, these propositions are alternatives
to the Allow or Deny policies that will not be used anymore.
A. Filtered announcements
The first solution aims to prevent groups from announcing
non-desired nodes in their groups. This is a functionality of
BGP that we apply in the MANET environment. To explain
the method, we use the following example, represented by
Figure 6.
A
Group A Group B
C
Group C
Filtered nodes
B1
B2
Figure 6: Inter-MANET communication with the filtering
solution
Group A and group C are allowed to communicate; however,
B and C have low-level trust. Our proposition to make the
two distant A and C groups communicate, even if there is a
blocking group on the route, is as follows. Groups A and C
have no restriction on their announcements and can broadcast
all the routes. B1 and B2 receive these new accessible nodes
and share them in group B. Once routes from group A
reach B2 (and reciprocally routes from group C reach B1),
the gateways B1 and B2 remove from the announcement
all the nodes from group B they do not want to share. B1
and B2 act as gateways i.e. as nodes that have at least one
neighbor in another group. They have no particular capacities
or features but are useful to establish communications. This
method let A and C exchange first routing data, then data,
without knowledge of group B topology. When A sends a
packet to C, the packet is forwarded to the gateway of A,
which forwards to B1, designed as next hop. B1, by its intra-
domain routing protocol, sends the packet to B2. Finally, B2
delivers the packet to group C.
B. Tunneling
The second solution we propose is to build ciphered com-
munications through the network and not only inside groups
or between two adjacent groups. The main advantage of this
solution is to keep confidential communications, whatever the
groups on the data route are. As illustrated in Figure 7, two
levels of communication exist:
• Group level: application data are exchanged inside the
groups. Ciphered with the group key (Kgroup),
• Inter-domain level: application data are exchanged be-
tween groups. Ciphered with a shared key, previously
created in the coalition plan (KAC , for group A and group
C communication).
KAC KAC
KAC
Group A Group B Group C
Figure 7: Inter-MANET communication with the tunneling
solution
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
In this section, we will present the conducted experimen-
tation, the assumptions and the comparison points for the
propositions of Section III.
A. Functional assumptions
In this part, we introduce some assumptions and definitions
to describe how the coalition is deployed. On the communi-
cation level, we consider that all the groups of the coalition
use the same technology, particularly about layer 2 protocols
(Data Link layer) and layer 3 protocols (Network layer). In our
experimentation, all nodes use WiFi and IPv4 technologies
since TDMA military devices were not possible to use. In
other deployments, it could also be UHF/VHF, TDMA...
This assumption is made to guarantee the transmission of
routing data through the network. The routing protocol used
to build the network is OLSR [4]. This proactive protocol
periodically sends HELLO messages to discover its neighbors.
Once the neighbors have been discovered, Topology Control
(TC) messages are in charge to report the link costs to calculate
routes to all available nodes. The timers used for OLSR
protocols are those advised in RFC 7181 (Hello 2s, TC 5s).
On the security level, we consider that all the exchanged
data are ciphered. Each group uses its own group key. External
nodes of the group can intercept communication but ciphered
packets prevent them from understanding communications.
Each node has two elements that enable it to prove its identity
to the other members of the coalition; a public/private key pair
with an associated certificate, and the trusted certificate of the
authorities used in the coalition. Given these elements, each
node is able to send ciphered and/or signed messages in the
coalition.
On the organizational level, each node embeds a policy
file. These policies are defined during the mission preparation.
Therefore, nodes are operational to build the coalition network.
According to each proposition of Section III, the policy file is
organized as follows:
• Filtered announcements: this file contains all the nodes
of the group that are not allowed to be announced for
inter-domain communications.
• Tunneling: this file contains all external nodes that are
allowed to communicate and the associate ciphering key.
This policy is consistent all over the coalition; i.e. if A
trusts B then, B trusts A.
B. Scenario
After the description of the deployment of the coalition
network, this part describes the scenario that is used to evaluate
the two propositions.
Our coalition scenario is composed of three groups, each
composed of three nodes. Groups A and C are high-level
trusted allied and can exchange routing information, but group
B, wants to keep confidential its routing data. By using simple
routing policies, such as Allow or Deny, the communication
between A and C would not be possible.
Our two solutions are compared with a flat OLSR network,
without inter-domain communications. By doing so, we build a
reference, which allows us to evaluate our solutions efficiency
about the mobility and the additional cost they generate.
Our propositions showed similar performances in terms of
data rate, packet loss or round-time trip on the given scenario
with static nodes. We included a mobile node to stress the
network and show the real performances of the solutions. The
scenario we used is illustrated in Figure 8. Nodes n1 and n9
want to exchange information on a UDP flow. During the first
thirty seconds, n1 moves and is still in range with its group by
the node n2. At 30 seconds, n1 goes in east direction during
n1
n2
n3 n4
n5
n6 n7
n8
n9
Duration : 90 sec - Velocity : 10m/s
Figure 8: Scenario used for experimentation
60 seconds to reach n8 range. In this interval, n1 will undergo
regular disconnections that will measure the effectiveness of
the solutions during a mobility situation.
C. Implementation
This section describes the environment used to simulate the
scenario and evaluate the efficiency of the proposed solutions.
We used Common Open Research Emulator (CORE2) software
to easily integrate our propositions in an ad hoc environment
and use mobility scripts. Filtered announcements and tunneling
are based on the same principle. Packets are intercepted by a
combination of iptables and NFQUEUE commands. They are
manipulated in a Python script with the Scapy3 library. Each
solution has its own script that do different tasks.
For the filtering solution, the iptables interception occurs
on OLSR packets only. These packets are evaluated with the
policy file that contains all the nodes that are not supposed
to be announced on the inter-domain links. If one or several
nodes are announced in the packet, it is removed and the
packet is reformed. Indeed, due to several fields that indicate
packet or message sizes, there is a need to recalculate each of
these fields and ensure that the packet remains understandable
and coherent for destination.
For the tunneling solution, the iptables interception occurs
on all packets. Depending on the destination (OLSR broadcast,
group member, inter-domain communication), the packet is
ciphered with the suitable key. For the incoming ciphered
packets, because we have no information on the nature of the
packet, we have to try all the possible keys. However, it is
more likely to receive a packet from the node group or an
OLSR beacon rather than a packet from another group. Thus,
we have defined a priority order on the use of the keys to have
more probability to correctly decipher the packet.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we present several measures that have been
extracted using the previous scenario. We made a connectivity
test including data speed, packet loss, jitter and round-time
trip between two distant allied nodes. In order to measure the
impact of such processing, we compare the measures for the
given scenario, to a simple OLSR network without groups.
2http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/ncs/products/core
3http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/
Figures 9 and 10 respectively show the data rate and the
jitter evolution during the simulation time. This experimenta-
tion is conducted ten times. All mean and standard deviation
values are synthesized in Table I.
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Figure 9: Data rate evolution during mobile scenario
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Figure 10: Jitter evolution during mobile scenario
Configuration Flat OLSR Filtering Tunneling
Mean Data rate (Mb/s) 0,614 0,612 0,603
σDatarate (Mb/s) 0,487 0,488 0,486
Mean jitter (ms) 0,071 0,101 0,831
σjitter (ms) 0,146 0,207 0,235
Mean Round-Trip time (ms) 166,660 168,127 171,923
σRound−TripTime (ms) 3,08 4,80 6,98
Packet Loss 41,7% 41,9% 42,4%
Table I: Mean and standard deviation values for a set of ten
experimentations on the mobile scenario
Iperf calculates performances in 1-second intervals. At
the begin of the mobility (0-30 sec), the communication is
fully operational. n1 is moving in range of its group so the
connection is not interrupted. During the second interval, n1
loses connectivity. That is the reason that received data rate
is decreasing. This phenomenon repeats as cycles until n1
reaches its final position. However, we can highlight these
variations whatever the network configuration is (flat, filtering
or tunneling). For all the configurations, the packet loss is
similar, which means, as the data rate, that the solutions does
not impact performances. It is mainly due to mobility and the
recovery delay of the routing protocol. The tunneling mode
slightly increases the jitter and the round-trip time. This can be
justified by the computation of the ciphering and deciphering
processes.
VI. RELATED WORK
Several works have been proposed to solve the issue of inter-
MANET communication in tactical networks. In this section,
we review some of them and how they work. In [8], the authors
propose the Inter-MANET Routing protocol (InterMR). This
protocol uses some functionalities of BGP such as inter-
domain routing table, external and internal messages and a
beaconing routine to regularly discover neighbors. A Bloom
Filter [1], [2] is attached to each MANET and is in charge
of the address plan synthesis. To communicate with the other
domains, each groups elects one or several gateways based on
their traffic. InterMR is an evolution of a previous protocol
designed by the authors, namely InterDomain Routing for
MANET (IDRM [3]).
Two BGP evolutions have been proposed in [7] and [9]. The
first protocol is BGP Mobility eXtension (named BGP-MX).
The main contribution is a central name server called DPBS
(Distributed Peer Broker Service). Each node is permanently
connected to this server to receive the network information
(IP address, AS number...). Thus, this system can be easily
downed if the DPBS is out of order.
The second evolution is BGP Manet Routing (BGP-MR)
described in [9]. BGP-MR runs with OSPF-MDR, an evolution
of OSPFv3 [5]. The OSPF DR (Designated Router) elected
are used to easily transmit information all over the network
and build the topology. All nodes are gateways but they can
be in different states: passive or active. In passive mode,
a node behaves as a simple router. However, it can still
listen to beacons from other groups to detect new neighbors.
If a node from another AS is close, the node becomes an
active gateway and distributes its routing information with this
neighbor. In case of AS split or merge, the gateway removes
from its routing table all the information provided by the
disconnected neighbor, in order to keep fresh and valid routes.
ASes memberships are defined by the Bloom Filter. In our
previous work and in this paper, we proposed solutions to
integrate policies and improve them, as authors suggested as
future work.
In [11], CIDR (Cluster-based Inter-Domain Routing) proto-
col uses the cluster architecture. In each AS, a Cluster Head is
elected depending on the traffic it carries. Its goal is to collect
all the information for the nodes of its cluster and redistribute
routing information. The Bloom Filter is also used to have a
representation of the nodes in each AS. CIDR handles specific
cases of splitting and merging. Indeed, if an AS splits, the
resulting ASes have to recreate the previous AS if they want
to merge again. Other merge combinations are not possible.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this article, we proposed a representation model of
connectivity and policy in an inter-MANET network. Based
on this model, we showed that binary policies (Allowed and
Denied links) lead to block communications in a coalition
network. Thus, we proposed two solutions to improve the
use of routing policies in coalition networks. On the one
hand, a filtering solution to prevent groups from broadcasting
their internal topologies. On the other hand, a tunneling
solution where each communication is ciphered from source
to destination. These two propositions have been validated
on a static network and show equivalent performances. We
have therefore chosen to propose a scenario including mobility
to test the robustness of the solutions. This experimentation
showed that our two solutions are efficient and do not degrade
network performances.
The next step is to include non-military entities such as
non-governmental organizations or civil safety services that
are groups of nodes that do not participate to the mission
planning and do not have the same technology or credential
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